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We consider that in a society, there are conflicts of income redistribution between the rich
(class) and the poor (one), and the extent of income inequality creates conflict between these
two groups in the society, bringing to a revolution aimed for more redistribution. In our
model, we assume that there are two types of poor: weak and strong. The difference between
the weak type and the strong type is that the later can win through a revolution, but the
former can not. However, this is the private information of the poor and is not observed by
the rich. When income inequality increases, with this asymmetry of information, the weak
type of the poor is more likely to attempt a revolution. As a result, larger inequality results in
higher probability of democratization.
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The reasons some societies switch from nondemocracy to democracy are numer-
ous. For example, the introduction of universal suffrage; certain ideological pref-
erences over regimes (Diamond 1999); the importance of economic crises in trig-
gering democratizations processes (Haggard and Kaufman 1995) and so on.
In this paper, we discuss the transitions from dictatorship to democracy when
the income inequality of societies becomes high. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)
present the ﬁrst systematic formal analysis framework of redistributive conﬂict, in
which the poor can pose a revolutionary threat aiming for more redistribution and
the rich choose between concessions and oppression. They conclude that under
complete information (the types of the poor and the rich; the cost of revolution),
there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between inter-group inequality and de-
mocratization.
The model explored in the present paper is based on Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006). However, in this paper, we assume that the types of the poor (weak and
strong) and the revolution cost are private information of the poor, that is, are
not observed by the rich. In this framework, the rich will make concessions (i.e.,
promises) to avoid a revolution initiated by the poor. However, because the rich
hold political power and, therefore, have the right to determine the level of taxes
and transfers in the future, the promise of concessions may not be sufﬁciently
credible. Therefore, if the poor have great certainty to believe that the rich would
keep the promises, the poor will not initiate a revolution; if the poor anticipate
that the nondemocratic regime will renege on its promises, they may initiate a
revolution with strong probability. In fact, we will show that with asymmetry of
information, an increase in inter-group equality may cause the weak type of the
poor also initiate a revolution. As a result, there will be a great possibility for the
transition from non-democracy to democracy.
Thepaper isorganizedasfollows. In section2, wepresent the fundamentalsof
the model; in section 3, we analyze the gameof incomplete information; in section
14, we investigate the inﬂuence of the magnitude of inter-group income inequality
on the probability of the rich creating a democracy; and section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We assume that there are two types of poor actors, W(weak) and S(strong). The
distinction between the two types is that when the type of the poor is W, the
revolution will fail and when the type is S, the revolution will succeed. However,
this is private information of the poor and is not observed by the rich. If the poor
do not initiate a revolution, the rich will perform a redistribution. And if the poor
initiate a revolution, the rich make a decision between oppression (denoted O) and
full democratization (denoted D).
2.1 General Setting of the Model
We assume that in the population (normalized to unity) there exist two classes
of individuals: the rich and the poor. A fraction 1 ¡ ± > 1=2 of the agents is
poor (superscripted p), with identical income yp. The remaining fraction ± is rich
(superscripted r) from an oligarchy, with identical income yr. The mean income
is, ¯ y = ±yr + (1 ¡ ±)yp, and, yp < ¯ y < yr. The type of the poor is W (weak)
with probability a and S (strong) with probability 1 ¡ a. Our focus is on the
distributional conﬂict, so here, we deﬁne income inequality, µ, as the share of
total income accruing to the rich; In other words, we have:
y
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Notice that an increase in µ represents an increase in inequality and from (1),
we obtain µ > ±.
The timing of events is as follows:
² The rich perform a redistributive policy to avoid revolution.
² Nature chooses the type of the poor (t = W;S), but this type is not observed
by the rich.
2² The poor move next and choose one of two actions: non-revolution (NR) or
revolution (R).
² If the poor choose NR, the rich will perform the promised tax rate.
² IfthepoorchooseR, thentherichdecidewhethertorealizedemocratization
(D) or initiate oppression (O).
If the poor choose R, the rich update their beliefs about the type of the poor.
We denote the posterior beliefs of the rich that the weak type of the poor is p and
the strong one is 1 ¡ p, and the rich democratize with probability q and oppress
with 1 ¡ q.
Figure 1 (Appendix 1) presents the game tree. We consider that if the poor
attempt a revolution, the payoff of the rich depends on the type of the poor. If the
type of the poor is W, the revolution will fail; if the type is S, repression fails and
democratization will be realized.
Now we consider the situation that the rich perform a redistribution. The
government(the rich) has a balanced budget that levies a proportional tax on in-
come and performs a lump-sum transfer to all individuals equally. We assume
that levying a redistributive tax rate ¿ increases the costs of taxation C(¿) where
C0(¢) > 0;C00(¢) > 0;C0(0) = 0 and C0(1) = 1. Therefore, the payoffs of the






(1 ¡ ¿)yi + (¿ ¡ C(¿)) ¯ y if k = NR;
(1 ¡ ¿p)yi + (¿p ¡ C(¿p)) ¯ y if k = D:
(2)
where i = fp;rg.2
We know that under non-democracy, the tax rate, ¿, is performed by the rich
which is smaller than the equilibrium tax rate under democracy, i.e., most pre-
ferred by the poor, ¿p, (by Median Voter Theorem). Actually, by the F.O.C, we
1See Persson and Tabellini 2000, pp. 19-21.
2We can ﬁnd equilibrium tax rate, ¿p, by maximizing the post-tax income of a poor agent. The
F.O.C gives ¡yp + (1 ¡ C0(¿p))¯ y = 0. By (1), we can obtain (µ ¡ ±)=(1 ¡ ±) = C0(¿p).
3know that ¿p is a function of (µ;±). Next, we deﬁne the payoffs of the rich and the







yr ¡ Á¹¯ y if j = W,
0 if j = S,
(3)
where ¹ is the destroyed fraction of the mean income of post-revolution, i.e. the
revolution cost (0 < ¹ < 1), and Á is a parameter in (0;1).3
This means that if the rich choose oppression, their payoffs depend on the type
of the poor. If the type of the poor is W, the oppression will succeed with a small








yp ¡ ¹¯ y if j = W,
1 ¡ ¹
1 ¡ ±
¯ y if j = S.
(4)
This deﬁnition means that if revolution falls, it will cost the poor ¹¯ y and if
revolution succeeds, they get a payoff of
1¡¹
1¡± ¯ y. (we assume ¹ > ±).
Next, we deﬁne the condition for the strong type of the poor to attempt a
revolution since the revolution will surely succeed.
Deﬁnition 3. We deﬁne a “revolution constraint”: if yp(OjS) > yp, the poor may
attempt a revolution, i.e.,
µ > ¹: (5)
Therefore a greater inequality (i.e., higher µ) makes the “revolution constraint”
more likely to bind. Since non-revolution and non-democratization are the best
outcomes for the rich, therefore they will try to prevent a revolution by a redis-
tributive policy if at all possible. Whether they can do this depends on the value
3In practice, any value, which is smaller than yr(D), will be reasonable. For simplicity, we
assume that yr(OjS) = 0.
4they can promise to the citizens. Clearly, the most favorable tax rate they can
offer to the poor is ¿p. However, this is not as good as offering ¿p for certain.
That is to say, if the redistributive tax rate satiﬁes yp(NR) ¸ yp(OjS), then such
a concession would prevent a revolution attempt.4 By (1), (2) and (4), we get
¹ ¸ µ ¡ [¿
p(µ ¡ ±) ¡ (1 ¡ ±)C(¿
p)]: (6)
If inequality is limited (i.e., µ is relatively low) or there is a high probability that
the promise made by the rich will be upheld, then living under nondemocracy is
not too bad for the poor, (6) will hold and even the strong type of poor will not
revolt too.
To analyze the model, we determine a critical value of the revolution cost ¯ ¹
such that (6) holds as an equality:
¯ ¹ = µ ¡ [¿
p(µ ¡ ±) ¡ (1 ¡ ±)C(¿
p)]:
Then, when ¹ > ¯ ¹, (6) will hold. We can then know that if the rich perform a tax
rate ¿ · ¿p (i.e., by promising) such that yp(NR) = yp(OjS), they can prevent a
revolution attempt successfully. Therefore, ¿ satisﬁes
¹ = µ ¡ [¿(µ ¡ ±) ¡ (1 ¡ ±)C(¿)]: (7)
However, because the cost of revolution is not observed by the rich, the redistribu-
tive tax ¿ can not always prevent a revolution attempt. And with the asymmetry
of information, the poor of weak type may also attempt a revolution. Therefore if
a revolution arises, what will the rich choose — democratization or oppression?
We will present a solution to this question in the following analysis of the game.
3 Analysis of the Game
Since the type of the poor and the revolution cost are not observed by the rich, the
poor of weak type may take advantage of the asymmetry of information to attempt
a revolution. There exists the following perfect Bayesian equilibria:
4In this framework, we assume that the purpose of the poor is only to aim for more redistribu-
tion and they have no ideological preferences over regimes.
5Proposition 1. ² If (5) does not bind, both types of the poor choose NR and
the rich choose O, with beliefs p 2 [¯ p;1]; the rich redistribute with ¿ = 0.
And even if the rich redistribute with any ¿ 2 (0;¿p), the equilibrium does
not change.
² If (5) binds but ¹ ¸ ¯ ¹, the rich redistribute with ¿ which satisﬁes (7); both
types of the poor choose NR and the rich choose O, with beliefs p 2 [¯ p;1].
And if ¿ does not satisfy (7), the strong type of the poor choose R, the weak
type of the poor choose NR and the rich choose O, with beliefs p 2 [¯ p;1]
off the equilibrium path.
This proposition means that if the “revolution constraint” does not bind, a
revolution would not be attempted by any type of the poor, so the rich do not
perform any redistribution; and even if the “revolution constraint” binds, the rich
can also prevent the revolution by redistribution.
However, when the “revolution constraint” binds and the cost of revolution is
small, there will be the following two equilibria:
Proposition 2. ² When (5) binds and ¹ < ¯ ¹,
– A semi-pooling equilibrium: the strong type of the poor always choose
R and the weak type of the poor choose R with probability r and
NR with probability 1 ¡ r, where r =
¯ p(1¡a)
a(1¡¯ p); the rich democratize
with probability ¯ q and oppress with probability 1 ¡ ¯ q with beliefs ¯ p.
If the rich choose D, then both types of the poor choose R and the
equilibrium redistributive tax rate (ERTR) is ¿p; and if the rith choose
O, then the weak type of the poor choose NR.
– A pooling equilibrium: both types of the poor will initiate R and the
rich will choose D, with beliefs p = a 2 [0; ¯ p]; the ERTR is ¿p. And
if ¿ < ¿p, the strong type of the poor choose R, the weak type of the
poor choose NR, the rich choose O, with beliefs p = a 2 [0; ¯ p] off the
equilibrium path.
6(See Appendix 2).
First note that revolution is a dominant strategy for the strong type of the
poor. Then the nature of equilibrium hinges on whether the weak type of the poor
chooses revolution or not. There is always a semi-pooling equilibrium in which
the weak type of the poor is indifferent between choosing revolution and non-
revolution and the rich are indifferent between democratization and oppression.
However, in the semi-pooling equilibrium, the weak type of the poor attempt a
revolution with probability r and hence this behavior would raise the probability
of democratization.
More important for this paper is the pooling equilibrium. With asymmetric
information, when the poor stage a revolution the rich have to democratize. The
reason is that if the type of the poor is strong, the oppression fails and the payoff
of the rich would be 0. This is the worst outcome for the rich, in consequence
democratization would be realized with a greater possibility.
4 Concluding Remarks and Futher Research
We have provided a framework in which an income inequality increase gives the
opportunity to the poor, due to asymmetric information, of initiating a revolution
and particularly, if the cost of oppression becomes higher (i.e., criticism from the
international society), there would be a greater possibility for the rich to democra-
tize. And another important point is that once democracy is created, the problem
of how to consolidate it is left. In particular, the threaten from a coup undertaken







































Figure 1: The Game Tree
8Appendix 2
We deﬁne the posterior beliefs of the rich, p, that if p = ¯ p, then the rich would be
indifferent between D and O. Since their expected payoff from D is pyr(D) +
(1 ¡ p)yr(D), and their expected payoff from O is pyr(OjW) + (1 ¡ p)yr(OjS),





If p < ¯ p, the rich will democratize. In contrast, if p > ¯ p, the rich will initiate
oppression.
We also deﬁne ¯ q as the probability of democratization by the rich following a
revolution that will make the weak type of the poor indifferent between choosing
R and NR. This is given by qyp(D)+(1¡q)yp(OjW) = yp(NR), where the left






When the rich choose D with probability q > ¯ q, the weak type would initiate
a revolution with probability 1. In contrast, if q < ¯ q, R would not arise. If the
type of the poor is S, the poor will always choose a revolution.
In a word, when q > ¯ q, any type of the poor will initiate a revolution and the
probability of the poor’s type being W is given by p equals to a by Bayes’ rule.
In contrast, if q < ¯ q, the weak type chooses NR and the strong one initiates a
revolution. It means p = 0 but it is contradictory to p = ¯ p. When q = ¯ q, the
strong type initiates a revolution and the weak one plays a local strategy. Here, we
deﬁne the probability that the weak type initiates a revolution as r. From Bayes’s
rule,
r =
¯ p(1 ¡ a)
a(1 ¡ ¯ p)
: (10)
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